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NEW DIMENSIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
P. ALLAN DIONISOPOULOS*
H ISTORICALLY the Supreme Court of the United States has per-
mitted individuals to assert the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation only within defined circumstances. The one judicial test is:
will the answers incriminate directly or provide a link in the chain
of evidence? This test has made it possible for the Court to identify
those instances in which the privilege could not be asserted-situ-
ations in which there is no real danger that answers will lead to
criminal prosecution.' Since the emphasis is on whether a criminal
proceeding is a distinct possibility, the Court has decided that the
privilege may not be asserted when a statute of limitations bars
prosecution, or when the ground for refusing to answer is that the
* The author earned a B.A. in 1948, a B.S. in 1950, an M.A. in 1950 at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota and a Ph.D. in 1960 at U.C.L.A. He has been a member of the
political science faculties at Indiana University, University of Arizona and the University
of Wisconsin. He is presently a Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois
University.
1 While some of these situations will be discussed in the text, others can be briefly
noted at this time. One example is that the privilege may not be claimed if the individual
has waived it. For example, if he takes the stand in his own defense, or if he volun-
tarily "answered as to materially criminating facts . . . he cannot then stop short and
refuse further explanation, but must disclose fully what he has attempted to relate."
Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 226, 276 (1896), cited by the Court with approval in Rogers
v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951).
The Court has also ruled that the privilege is personal and may not be asserted
to protect another. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); United States v. Murdock, 248
U.S. 141 (1931); Vatjauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); and
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
A third instance is the Court's declaration that the privilege does not extend to
corporate records. Books, records, and papers of a corporation are kept "in a representa-
tive rather than in a personal capacity [and] cannot be the subject of the privilege against
self-incrimination, even though production of the papers might tend to incriminate
personally." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367 (1951); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
1
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witness might subject himself to social disgrace. Where the statute
of limitations bars prosecution, it is obvious that no criminal action
is possible; therefore, the witness may be compelled to testify.
The second reason, that is, the matter of social disgrace, has been
no less obvious to the Court as an instance in which the claimed
danger does not fall within its construction of the clause. However,
such things as social disgrace and the possibility of loss of job have
been sufficiently sound reasons in the judgment of some justices
to urge a more liberal application of the privilege.
2
While, then, a few argue that the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment should provide an absolute shelter for those
who seek its protection, a majority of the members of the Court
have adhered to the narrow construction. This was true, for ex-
ample, in Brown v. Walker (1896),' with the Court specifically
choosing a narrow rather than literal construction of the clause;
and it had been apparent many years later when Justice Frank-
furter rejected a request that the Court " 'return' to a literal read-
ing" of the fifth amendment.
The purposes of this paper are to determine (1) how broad
are the areas within which the privilege may now be asserted? and
(2) how do recent decisions differ from prior rulings in similar
situations? To reach these purposes it will be necessary to consider
how the privilege operates with respect to four specific matters:
(1) the incorporation of the privilege into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, thereby making it operational
against the states;5 (2) the effect upon immunity statutes and the
two sovereignties doctrine of the Court's "reading" the privilege
against self-incrimination into the fourteenth amendment; 6 (3) the
2 In stating that the privilege only protects against criminal prosecution the Court
has rejected various efforts to claim the privilege on grounds of social disgrace. However,
Justice Field argued that nothing was more abhorrent than to compel a person, who had
achieved status within society, "to reveal crimes of which he had repented, and of which
the world had been ignorant." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 632 (1896). Similar
objections have been voiced by Justices Black and Douglas in dissenting opinions in
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 141 and 176 (1961).
3 The Court chose to construe the clause "as it was doubtless designed, to effect a
practical and beneficent purpose-not necessarily to protect witnesses against every
possible detriment." 161 U.S. 591, 594 (1896).
4 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956). The sole concern of the clause
"is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness" of being forced to incriminate
himself. Ibid.
5 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
NEW DIMENSIONS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
prohibition on prejudicial comment on assertion of the privilege
in state courts; 7 and (4) the relationship of the self-incrimination
provision to statutes requiring the registration of members of
proscribed organizations. 8 The first three subjects pertain in some
way to the American federal-state system and may be considered
together. The fourth relates largely to the federal government,
especially to the problems created by the Internal Security Act of
1950, and will be discussed separately.
THE Two SOVEREIGNTIES DOCTRINE
In a number of decisions the Court had held that an indi-
vidual could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination if
he had been given immunity from criminal prosecution.9 Such
decisions had been in accordance with the Court's narrow con-
struction of the self-incrimination clause, and in fact were applied
even though the immunity was not perfect in that a witness' an-
swers might be used against him by another sovereign.' 0 Thus,
the two sovereignties doctrine developed from these instances of
individuals being caught between two governments. It also had a
direct relationship to the question of whether the privilege could
be successfully asserted. Its history should be examined to deter-
mine how it evolved and how it has been modified recently.
The Court has not always followed a two sovereignties rule
in self-incrimination cases. Different positions had been taken in
the various cases which arose between United States v. Saline Bank
(1828)" and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission (1964).12 Not
until the 1930's had the two sovereignties doctrine been explicitly
stated by the Court. 3
Initially, in Saline Bank, there had been at least a suggestion
7 Griffin v. California overturns the practice in some states where court officers are
permitted to make negative comments regarding a person's claim of the privilege. 380
U.S. 609 (1965).
8 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
9 E.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), and Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956).
10 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371
(1958).
11 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
12 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
13 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); United States v. Murdock, 290
U.S. 389 (1933).
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that the constitutional privilege could be asserted whenever a
second sovereign was involved.14 Yet that decision was all but
overlooked by the Court in the next 100 and more years. Only
Ballmann v. Fagin (1906)"5 acknowledged it as a precedent before
the Murphy decision in 1964.
The Saline Bank case originated as an equity action wherein
the United States sought discovery and relief against the bank and
its officials. A law of the State of Virginia forbade any company,
not having a state banking charter, to trade or deal as a bank within
the state's jurisdiction. Penalties, in the form of fines against such
company and its officials, were prescribed in the Virginia statute.
Consequently, the defendants in the action had insisted that they
not be compelled to make disclosures whereby they might accuse
themselves of criminal conduct under the law of Virginia.
The defendant's plea was sustained in both the United States
District and Supreme Courts. Justice Marshall's decision, uphold-
ing the defendants' right to claim the privilege, is pertinent to
this essay for two reasons: first, he had stated the rule regarding
self-incrimination as being clearly "that a party is not bound to
make any discovery which would expose him to penalties .... 16
Second, the penalties which he had in mind were those prescribed
in the Virginia law, for he had stated that the reason for the defen-
dants' pleas had been that they would subject themselves to penal-
ties under the statute of Virginia. Therefore, Marshall said, this
case fell within the rule regarding a person's exposing himself to
the danger of prosecution.
The Virginia statute declared it unlawful for an association
or company to operate as a bank without a charter, and it autho-
rized the State Attorney General to initiate an equity action against
any association found in violation of the law. A proviso stated:
[N]o disclosure made by any party defendant to such suit in
equity, and no books or papers exhibited by him in answer to the
bill, or under the order of the court, shall be used as evidence
against him in any motion or prosecution under this law .... 17
14 Supra note 11, at 104.
15 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
16 Supra note 11, at 104.
17 Id. at 101.
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This immunity provision of the Virginia statute was not appli-
cable in Saline Bank, since the proceeding involved there was not
the kind to which the law had reference. Nor, in view of the spe-
cific language of the statute, could there have been a statutory con-
struction declaring that the legislative intent was to protect a
person against criminal prosecution, even though disclosure had
been made within the jurisdiction of another sovereign. In view
of these things, Justice Marshall's ruling takes on added signifi-
cance, for it permitted nothing resembling the two sovereignties
doctrine.
While it is true that Justice Marshall had not specifically
rejected the two sovereignties doctrine, it was at least implicit
that the Court would not permit one sovereign to benefit from
discoveries made within the jurisdiction of another. That this
implied ruling was generally disregarded by the Court before
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission (1964)18 becomes apparent in
an examination of a number of decisions in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries.
The first several cases of significance to this study were differ-
ent from Saline Bank in that immunity statutes, national and state,
posed specific problems. Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892)19 had
been one case in which the petitioner claimed the privilege against
self-incrimination, even though a national immunity law was
available. He refused to answer questions on the ground tlhat the
National Immunity Act2° did not protect him against the danger
of criminal proceedings in a state court. In this instance, the Court
felt no urgent need to answer the question whether the petitioner
had properly refused to make disclosures, since the national im-
munity statute was too narrow in its protection even as to the
possibility of federal criminal proceedings.
21
While the Court had refused to enter into a discussion of
the matter of two sovereigns, it had announced that the statute
18 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Ballmann v. Fagin had been decided on other grounds, Holmes
at least acknowledged Marshall's ruling in stating: "according to United States v. Saline
Bank . . . he was exonerated from disclosures which would have exposed him to penalties
of the state law." 200 U.S. 186, 195 (1906).
19 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
20 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
21 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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''must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution of the
offense to which the question relates. '2 2 If this statement were
broadly construed and applied, it would protect an individual
against the possibility of being tried by a second sovereign on the
basis of testimony which he had provided to the first. This was
in the mind of the appellant in Brown v. Walker (1896).23 But in
that case a majority of the justices rendered a statutory construc-
tion which removed the possibility of prosecution in the state
courts: the immunity provided was to be "general and to be
applicable whenever and in whatever court such prosecution may
be had. ' 24 Nor did the Court find an urgent need to meet the
problem in Hale v. Henkel (1906),25 since the possibility of prose-
cution by the second sovereign was too remote.26
Nothing explicit with regard to the two sovereigns issue had
been stated before the two Murdock decisions of the 1930's. Justice
Marshall's brief opinion in the Saline Bank case had suggested
that the constitutional privilege operated. Counselman v. Hitch-
cock (1892) had resulted in the overthrowing of an immunity
statute without discussing the two sovereignties issue. Brown had
sustained as valid the 1893 National Immunity Act and had dis-
missed the question about the two sovereigns by way of statutory
construction. And in the Hale case the Court had refused to dis-
cuss the matter by reason of the remoteness of the possibility that
the witness would have testified himself into a state criminal ac-
tion.
Despite a generally confused history relating to the matter
of the two sovereigns, as reflected in a number of decisions other
than those discussed above,27 the Court presumed in United States
v. Murdock (1931)28 that the two sovereignties rule was established
doctrine:
This court has held that immunity against state prosecution
is not essential to the validity of federal statutes, declaring that a
22 Ibid.
23 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
24 Id. at 595.
25 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
26 Id. at 69.
27 E.g., Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
And see Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 549 (1957).
28 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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witness shall not be excused from giving evidence on the ground
that it will incriminate him, and also that the lack of state power
to give witnesses protection against federal prosecution does not
defeat a state immunity statute.
29
This pronouncement indicated that the two sovereignties rule had
been previously enunciated and long followed, and that this doc-
trine was compatible with the constitutional provision against
compulsory self-incrimination. Yet in the second Murdock case
(1933)30 the Court admitted that not until the previous decision
"had it been settled" that a witness under investigation by a fed-
eral tribunal "could not refuse to answer on account of probable
incrimination under state law."'" At most this admission meant
that, while there might have been confusion prior to 1931, there
could be no longer be any question whether the privilege might be
asserted under such circumstances. Moreover, the first decision
had made it clear that this was a two-way arrangement: a witness
could not claim the privilege before a United States tribunal on
the ground that he might incriminate himself under state law; nor
were state immunity statutes to be voided by reason of the possibil-
ity of subsequent federal prosecution.
The second situation had been present in Feldman v. United
States (1944),32 for the petitioner, who had answered questions
with regard to criminal activities under state law, found that his
immunized testimony had been used against him by the national
government. In answering Feldman's objections to the use of his
testimony, the Court applied both the silver platter3 3 and national
supremacy doctrines. With respect to the first of these the Court
said that the national government had not compelled discovery,
therefore, the evidence was not barred merely because it had been
given under cover of the state's immunity statute.3 4 Under the
second doctrine the Court insisted that state laws may not operate
29 Id. at 149.
30 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
31 Id. at 396.
32 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
33 In Mapp v. Ohio Justice Clark defined the "silver platter" doctrine as one "which
allowed federal judicial use of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution by state
agents." 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
34 Supra note 32, at 492. This doctrine followed the Court's reasoning in an earlier
search and seizure case: "What remedies the defendant may have against them we need
not inquire, as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such
(state) officials." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388 (1914).
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to prevent the United States from acting in its authorized capac-
ity.8
5
No matter which of the three doctrines might be applied, a
dilemma persisted. If a witness were to refuse to answer incrim-
inating questions, he placed himself in jeopardy of a contempt
citation. And if he did answer the questions, he ran the risk of
being prosecuted by the other sovereign. The Court was to be-
come increasingly aware of this dilemma. One situation reflecting
this problem was found in United States v. Kahriger (1953),36 a
case in which the danger of prosecution by the second sovereign
was the central issue. The 1951 Wagering Tax Act required those
who purchased the federal gambling stamp to register with Inter-
nal Revenue and to provide specific information.17 To the book-
maker, the revenue feature of this statute was secondary in impor-
tance to the objective of obtaining information, since the data
provided on the registration form was to be made available to state
authorities. Kahriger had claimed the privilege of the fifth amend-
ment in refusing to register. The Court ruled against him, stating
that the act was prospective rather than retrospective, and that it.
did not require him to make disclosures about offenses already
committed. On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas saw
the act in a different light: it was "a squeezing device contrived to
put a man in federal prison if he refuses to confess himself into a
state prison.""8
In the following year, the Court was faced with the applicabil-
ity of the two sovereigns doctrine in another situation in which
both national and state governments were interested in a gam-
bler's activities. Adams, a resident of Maryland, had cooperated
fully with a congressional committee investigating organized
crime in the United States. His cooperation had been obtained
under a national immunity act; however, his testimony was also
used against him by the State of Maryland in a proceeding under
85 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1940). It is at least worth mentioning that
John Marshall, the author of the national supremacy doctrine, had been faced with an
identical situation in Saline Bank, yet he did not permit this doctrine to stand as an
obstruction to defendant's claim of the privilege. 26 U.S. 100, 104 (1828).
36 345 U.S. 22.
37 26 U.S.C. § 4412 (1954).
58 Supra note 36, at 36.
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its anti-gambling laws. Adams v. Maryland (1954)9 was to prove
an exception to the application of the two sovereigns doctrine,
and it was not consonant with prior rulings in the Murdock and
Feldman decisions. In the Adams case the Court ruled that Con-
gress intended that the immunity provision extend to both state
and national governments, since it forbade the use of such testi-
mony "in any criminal proceeding. . . in any court....
At least by implication this represented an application of the
national supremacy doctrine. Congress may make a national law
operate in such a way as to affect state laws or policies, a ruling
which had been enunciated many years earlier by Chief Justice
Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia (182 1).41 Yet this was not in accord
with the Murdock and Feldman decisions with respect to immu-
nity statutes, for they suggested that neither sovereign might inter-
fere with legitimate functions of the other.
If, in the decisions which began with United States v. Mur-
dock (1931),42 the Court seemed to be unduly harsh in permitting
the existence of a dilemma for persons caught between the two
sovereigns, it might best be explained in terms of the Court's idea
about the price which we must pay for federalism.
To some persons, especially those caught in the dilemma, the
price we pay for federalism is too high. Included in these costs
is the possibility, as noted by the Michigan Supreme Court, that
federal rights will be weakened:
It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one is not sub-
jected to self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a
State judicial proceeding which testimony may forthwith be used
against him in a Federal criminal prosecution. 43
No less concerned about the high cost of federalism were Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Black, as revealed in
their dissenting opinions in Knapp v. Schweitzer (1958)," and
Mills v. Louisiana (1959).
45
89 347 US. 179 (1954).
40 Id. at 181, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1948).
41 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
42 Supra note 28.
43 People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 651, 29 N.W.2d 284, 287 (1947).
44 357 U.S. 371, 382 (1958).
45 360 U.S. 230, 231, and 236 (1959).
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In each of these cases, there had been some degree of collusion
between state and national officials, a factor which added a new
kind of question to the issue of immunity acts and the two sover-
eignties doctrine. Knapp, a partner in a New York firm engaged
in interstate commerce, had refused to cooperate with a state
grand jury investigating bribery of labor union officials, and con-
spiracy and extortion in labor relations. He contended that the
New York Immunity Act could not protect him against prosecu-
tion under the national Labor Management Relations Act of
1947.46 The United States law also made it a crime for an em-
ployer to give money or things of value to labor union officials.
4 7
The Knapp case was in the pattern of others. It involved a situa-
tion in which both state and national laws defined similar conduct
as crimes, and both state and national officials were interested in
obtaining information relevant to the commission of offenses and
the effectiveness of law enforcement. But there had been one
element of difference in Knapp in that the United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York had publicly announced
his intention to cooperate with state officials investigating unfair
labor practices. His announced intention was a promise of cooper-
ation generally and had not been stated specifically with respect to
Knapp's conduct.
A majority of the members of the Court admitted that if a
national officer were "a party to the compulsion of testimony by
state agencies, the protection of the fifth amendment would
come into play .... ,"s However, the Court continued, it was not
necessary to decide that issue in Knapp, since the record was
"barren of evidence that the State was used as an instrument of
federal prosecution or investigation.
'4 9
The Knapp decision reaffirmed the two sovereignties doctrine
through a discussion about the "price to be paid for our federal-
ism." Individuals might regard this as too high a price, the Court
said, but:
[Against] it must be put what would be a greater price, that of
46 § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 157.
47 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1947).
48 Supra note 44, at 380.
49 Ibid.
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sterilizing the power of both governments by not recognizing the
autonomy of each within its proper sphere. 50
Even while restating the two sovereignties doctrine the Court
warned national officials not to take advantage of this recognition
of the State's autonomy in order to evade the Bill of Rights.51 In
view of this warning we might properly ask-How much evidence
of collusion must there be?
There had been little by way of an answer to this question in
Mills v. Louisiana (1959).52 However, the three dissenters were
satisfied that there had been ample evidence of collusion between
national and state authorities. Chief Justice Warren claimed that
the decisions in Knapp and Feldman, when taken in conjunction,
meant that a person could be convicted of a federal crime on the
basis of compelled testimony in a state investigation:
Such opportunities will not go unused unless the courts are vigilant
to protect the rights of persons who find themselves faced with
such coaction of federal and state prosecuting agencies. Such
vigilance becomes increasingly required as the Federal Govern-
ment, through prosecutions for tax evasion, moves into the criminal
areas regulated by the States.
53
What evidence was there that "such coaction" had been pres-
ent in the Mills case? To answer this question we might look to
the facts of the case as well as to the materials brought to light by
Chief Justice Warren.
Mills and others, police officials of the city of New Orleans,
were suspected of having accepted bribes from persons conducting
lotteries in violation of state law. These officers had been called
before a grand jury and, under authority of state law, were offered
full immunity from state prosecution for crimes, other than
perjury, which might be brought to light by their answers. They
still refused to answer the questions, claiming the privilege of the
fifth amendment. At the time that the state grand jury was sitting,
national officials and a United States grand jury were inquiring
into the possibility that some police officers had evaded payment of
federal taxes, a felony under national law.
50 Supra note 44, at 381.
51 Supra note 44, at 380.
52 360 U.S. 230 (1950).
53 Id. at 233.
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Chief Justice Warren noted that each of the appellants "had
been required to execute, and had executed, waivers of the statute
of limitations" with respect to federal tax liabilities during the
years in question.54 Moreover, the parties had stipulated that at the
time of the investigation there had been cooperation between
national, state and local officials regarding public bribery on the
part of certain members of the New Orleans Police Department
and income tax evasion, felonies under the law of the United
States of America and the State of Louisiana.55 Evidence of collu-
sion in the Mills case had been established. Nevertheless, the ma-
jority of the Court dismissed the appeal on authority of the Knapp
decision.
In the Knapp case the Court restated what had been true
since Twining v. New Jersey (1908):56
The sole-although deeply valuable-purpose of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination is the security of the
individual against the exertion of power of the Federal Govern-
ment to compel incriminating testimony with a view to enabling
that same Government to convict a man out of his own mouth.57
Over a period of many years the Court had refused to "read" the
privilege against self-incrimination into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment; 5s consequently, the individual was
not at liberty to assert this privilege in a state court proceeding or
before another agency of the state. During the period 1923 to 1961,
the Court examined state court proceedings merely to determine
whether there were violations of fundamental principles of liberty
and justice. This meant, then, that states were not required to
operate according to specific procedural safeguards such as those
found in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments.
While this doctrine was consistent with the Supreme Court's
ruling in Barron v. Baltimore (1833)' 9 that the Bill of Rights was
not applicable to the states, it also permitted two different stan-
dards to operate within the United States. Not until the 1960's did
54 Supra note 52, at 232.
55 Ibid.
56 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
57 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958).
58 E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117
(1961).
59 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
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the Court begin to correct this situation, roughly four decades
after it first began to inquire into state judicial proceedings. 60
It is reasonable for us to presume that the Court's persistent
refusal to incorporate the privilege into the fourteenth amend-
ment, and thereby permit two standards, had been responsible for
its positions in United States v. Murdock (1931),61 Feldman v.
United States (1944),62 and the Knapp and Mills cases. This pre-
sumption proceeds first from the fact that there cannot be consis-
tent adherence to principle where different standards of official
conduct are permitted. Second, while judges might claim, as they
did in Hurtado v. California (1884),3 that time produces new pro-
cedural safeguards (in lieu of the self-incrimination clause) as
adequate substitutes for time-tested ones, in many instances these
are not really alternatives. A judge might be a suitable alternative
to jurors, or an information serve in place of an indictment. But,
in the absence of the privilege against self-incrimination or a
prohibition on double jeopardy, no alternative safeguard is avail-
able to the defendant. Third, since the Court was faced with a
situation in which federal procedure was examined in light of
specific requirements (privilege against self-incrimination),
whereas state court proceedings were examined in light of abstract
principles (fundamental principles of liberty and fairness), it was
bound to be confused whenever both sovereigns were simulta-
neously involved.
The Court's refusal to impose a single standard left unan-
swered a question raised by Justices Black and Douglas. Can a state
court, they asked, "override a claim of a federal right seasonably
raised in the state proceeding," without destroying or nullifying
that right? 4 An answer to this question was forthcoming five years
later in cases out of Connecticut 5 and New Jersey.66
As recently as 1961, the Court had been called upon to answer
60 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), was followed by the Scottsboro Boys cases,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), and 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936);
Palko v. Connecticut, 30! U.S. 319 (1937).
61 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
62 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
63 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
64 Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230, 237 (1959).
65 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
66 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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the question, may a witness claim the privilege of the fifth amend-
ment in a state court proceeding?67 At that time the Court again
held that the privilege could not be claimed and relied upon
precedents going back to the Twining decision of 1908.68 Yet in
1964, in Malloy v. Hogan,69 the Court announced that the four-
teenth amendment provided the petitioner with the protection of
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. The Malloy
decision was part of a pattern which began with Mapp v. Ohio
(1961).70 Instead of judging state court proceedings in light of
fundamental principles of liberty and justice, lying at the base of
American civil and political institutions, 7' the Court began to
demand that state authorities and courts operate within the limits
of specific procedural safeguards.
72
While, then, the Malloy decision was only one instance in
which a provision of the Bill of Rights was declared operational
against the states through the fourteenth amendment, the dis-
senters argued that its possible adverse effect upon the federal
system more than outweighed whatever merits it might have. They
believed that the majority's decision involved serious conse-
quences "for the sound working of our federal system in the field
of criminal law."' 73 Support for this argument was found in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission (1964)," 4 a decision whereby
the Court repudiated the two sovereignties doctrine insofar as it
pertained to immunity statutes and self-incrimination.
As was previously discussed,75 Justice Marshall had early ex-
67 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
68 Id. at 128.
69 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
70 367 U.S. 643. In the Mapp decision the Court made the exclusionary rule (exclu-
sion of evidence illegally obtained) mandatory against the states under the fourteenth
amendment in the same way that it had previously operated against the national govern-
ment.
71 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
72 Included within this category other than Mapp are Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)-all who are charged with felonies in state courts have right to counsel;
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1960)-applies eighth amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment to states; Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 65, and Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)-extend the sixth amendment's right to confront witnesses to
state court proceedings. The Murphy case and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
are consequences of extending the privilege against self-incrimination to witnesses in state
proceedings.
73 378 U.S. at 27.
74 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
75 Supra at notes 14 and 15.
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pressed the view that the fact that two sovereignties were involved
should not preclude a defendant from receiving complete protec-
tion against self-incrimination z6 Only Justice Holmes' reference
in 1906 to the Saline Bank decision had been significant with re-
spect to Justice Marshall's opinion. In Ballman v. Fagin," Justice
Holmes cited the bank decision in exonerating the witness "from
disclosures which would have exposed him to the penalties of the
state law."7 8 On that occasion there had been an acknowledgement
of a constitutional doctrine which was certainly not apparent in
other decisions, especially when the two sovereignties rule became
fixed.79 But this constitutional doctrine was reestablished in the
Murphy case. The Court reasserted Justice Marshall's ruling,
stating that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a
witness in a federal court from being compelled to give testimony
which could be used against him in a state court.8 0 Moreover, what
had once been true in Saline Bank with respect to the operation
of the privilege in federal courts was now made true in state courts
as well. To understand the implications of this decision, we should
consider the Murphy case more fully.
The two petitioners, Murphy and Moody, had been sum-
moned to testify before the Commission. An investigation had
been instituted to determine the causes of a work stoppage at the
Hoboken piers. Immunity laws of both New York and New Jersey
were invoked to protect the witnesses against criminal action in
state courts. Nevertheless, they refused to give testimony on the
ground that state immunity laws could not protect them against
criminal prosecution under federal laws. Both civil and criminal
contempt judgments were pronounced by the court of first in-
stance, and while the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
criminal contempt conviction on procedural grounds, it sustained
the civil judgment on the authority of Knapp v. Schweitzer
(1958),81 and other cases applying the two sovereignties doctrine.8
2
76 United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
77 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
78 Id. at 195.
79 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), and 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
80 378 U.S. 52, 77-8.
81 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
82 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S.
141 (1931).
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This was to be the proper moment for an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, since there was now an opportunity
to consider the two sovereignties doctrine at the same time that the
privilege against self-incrimination was being made applicable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Both the Malloy and Murphy decisions were rendered on the
same day. The first, of course, was responsible for the repudiation
of the Twining precedent; and the second provided the Court
with an opportunity to reverse every deviation from Marshall's
opinion in United States v. Saline Bank (1828) . 3 Justice Goldberg
both reiterated Justice Marshall's rule and announced a new doc-
trine:
We hold that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protects a State witness against incrimination under federal
as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination
under state as well as federal law. 4
Several consequences became possible with the Murphy
decision. First, by making complete the protection of immunities
laws, the Court had introduced a variation on the two-way arrange-
ment prescribed in the first Murdock decision. There the Court
had said that the privilege could not be asserted before a United
States tribunal on the ground of possible incrimination under
state law; nor were state immunity statutes to be voided by reason
of possible federal prosecution. Now, both national and state im-
munity statutes had to operate to protect the witness against the
other sovereign. Second, since this was a two-way arrangement,
there would no longer be a need for national laws to extend immu-
nity provisions to state court proceedings, as had been the case in
both Brown v. Walker (1896),85 and Adams v. Maryland (1954).6
Third, the Murphy decision represented a specific repudiation of
any of the several doctrines (two sovereignties, silver platter and
national supremacy) which had been stated in previous cases.
Finally, no longer in the area of self-incrimination would the
Court declare that the unfortunate dilemmas faced by individuals
were part of the price which must be paid for federalism.
83 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
84 378 U.S. at 77.
85 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
8 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
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PREJUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE
ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
These immediate consequences of repudiating Twining and
other decisions were followed in 1965 with another, the Court's
refusal to permit prejudicial comment when defendants claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination. Privileges similar to that
of the fifth amendment are found in state constitutions. But six
states, New Jersey, Iowa, California, Connecticut, Ohio and New
Mexico permitted inferences to be drawn from a person's refusal
to testify.8 7 In fact, such had been the actual issue in Twining v.
New Jersey (1908).88 There, the trial court judge, acting under
authority of state law, had advised the jurors that they might take
into consideration the defendant's refusal to take the stand in his
own defense. It had been in conjunction with answering the
question whether the New Jersey law allowing comment violated
the fourteenth amendment that the Court had refused to "read"
the privilege of the fifth into the fourteenth.
As a consequence, not all privileges under state constitutions
operated as did that of the fifth amendment, since the state was at
liberty to decide whether prejudicial comment was permissible.
But this also meant that there were two different procedural stan-
dards present within the United States. At the national level, as
indeed in most states, unfavorable presumptions could not be
created by a defendant's assertion of the privilege. 9 Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court, on occasion, had condemned
78 Although the California and Ohio Constitutions specifically prohibit compulsory
self-incrimination, they also qualify the privilege by permitting comment. In Art. I, § 13
of the California Constitution it is provided that the defendant's "failure to explain or to
deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented
upon by the court and by the counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
The Ohio Constitution stipulates that the defendant's failure to testify may be considered
by the court and jury and may be made the subject of comment by counsel." Art. I, § 10.
In Connecticut the constitutional privilege (Art. I, § 9) had been qualified by rulings
of the state courts. Judges, but not prosecutors, could make prejudicial comment. State
v. Henno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 Ad. 181 (1934). The Constitution of New Mexico also prohibits
compulsory self-incrimination (Art. II, § 15); but the privilege is qualified by statute
(N.M. Stat. Ann., § 41-12-19).
Neither the New Jersey nor the Iowa Constitutions prohibit compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. Under rulings of their respective state courts prejudicial comment had been
permitted. See State v. Corby, 28 N.J. 106, 145 A.2d 289 (1958), and State v. Ferguson,
226 Iowa 361, 283 N.W. 917 (1939).
88 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
89 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964).
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the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a
person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. The
right of an accused person to testify, which had been in England
merely a rule of evidence, was so important to our forefathers
that they raised it to the dignity of a constitutional enact-
ment .... 90
On the other hand, a different principle was permitted by
Twining. An attempt had been made in 1947 to overturn Twin-
ing. Adamson, a person charged with murder under California
law, had refused to testify in his own defense. By taking the witness
stand he might have made a convincing statement about his inno-
cence, but he would also have made it possible for the prosecution,
on cross-examination, to ask him about three previous convictions.
A dilemma was present for the defendant under these circum-
stances; if he waived the privilege by testifying in his own behalf,
he made possible the impeachment of his defense by inviting ques.
tions about previous convictions; yet if he remained silent, the
prosecution was no less advantaged by the state law permitting
prejudicial comment."' The defendant was convicted. He appealed
to the Supreme Court, urging that it proclaim non-self-incrimina-
tion as "a fundamental national privilege or immunity protected
against state abridgment" by the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment.9 2 The Court, consistent with its prior declarations,
ruled that a state may control such a situation in accordance with
its own ideas of the most efficient administration of criminal jus-
tice.
93
The decisions in the Twining and Adamson cases were to
stand until 1965. Those precedents recognized, in effect, two
different legal principles because of the differences in practices
within national and state judicial systems, and even differences as
to practices among the states. On the authority of the Twining
and Adamson decisions, the trial court judge in a later California
murder case commented to the jury:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within
his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify, he
90 Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956). And see Frankfurter's
equally strong rebuke. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
91 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
92 Id. at 49.
93 Supra note 91, at 53.
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fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that
failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such
evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be
reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant
are the more probable.
94
On the one hand, there had been the trial judge's explicit state-
ment to the jury that Griffin had a right to claim the constitutional
privilege. On the other hand, there had been the foregoing
comment that unfavorable inferences might be drawn from
Griffin's refusal to testify. On appeal to the Supreme Court in
Griffin v. California," the quoted comment by the judge was held
to be reversible error.
Griffin appears as a logical extension of the Court's decision
in Malloy v. Hogan (1964).96 Actually, the Griffin case was more
closely related to Twining v. New Jersey (1908), 97 since the central
issue in each was that of prejudicial comment, not whether the
fourteenth amendment embodied the privilege of the fifth. Malloy
v. Hogan overturned Twining insofar as the latter held that the
federal privilege was not available in a state court. But whether
prejudicial comment was to be permitted had been, in some states,
a legislative rather than a constitutional matter. Even at the na-
tional level it was possible to question whether the amendment
itself or the statute" prohibited presumptions of guilt.
No problem existed as far as the Supreme Court was con-
cerned. What the national statute did, declared Justice Douglas,
reflected the "spirit of the Self-Incrimination clause" in forbidding
prejudicial comment.99 Therefore, even in the absence of a statu-
tory prohibition, the Constitution would protect the defendant;
and the same principle was applied to the states under the four-
teenth amendment.
Within the brief span of eleven months, June 15, 1964 to
April 28, 1965, and through the decisions of the Malloy, Murphy,
and Griffin cases, the Court had reversed a number of precedents.
94 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610 (1965).
95 Ibid.
96 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
97 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
98 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964).
99 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The consequence of these decisions was that the self-incrimination
clause had come to provide a protection unknown in previous
years. These decisions also reflected the viewpoints of the dissents
in the cases of the 1950's. Similarly, viewpoints in dissenting opin-
ions were also to become acceptable to the majority as the Court
turned its attention to still another matter, the relationship of




The foregoing discussion focused upon the relationship of
the privilege against self-incrimination to questions produced by
the federal system. In this section we will consider the relationship
of the privilege to statutory registration requirements, a matter
which has been essentially a national concern, although, as demon-
strated in United States v. Kahriger (1953),100 it might involve
federal questions as well. The Kahriger case had arisen from the
National Wagering Tax Act. Bookmakers were required to pur-
chase a stamp in each year in which they intended to accept wagers,
and they were also required to file registration forms with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Since the information provided on these
forms was available to state authorities, Kahriger refused to com-
ply with the registration requirements. His claim that the privilege
was available in such circumstances was invalidated by the Court
on the ground that the law was prospective rather than retrospec-
tive. It was not necessary, therefore, for Kahriger to make dis-
closures of past gambling offenses which might be used against him
in the state court. He was only required to make disclosures as to
his future intentions.'
The Wagering Tax Act is but one of several national laws
requiring that certain categories of persons register with an agency
of the United States Government. Other examples are laws requir-
ing the annual registration of aliens, 0 2 quarterly registration of
100 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
101 Id. at 32.
102 Registration requirements for aliens are found in 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301, 1502, 1303,
1304, 1305, and 1306 (1964).
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lobbyists 03 and registration of those who seek to promote the
interests of foreign governments . 4 None of these examples has an
immediate and direct relationship to the self-incrimination clause.
Bookies might indeed expect to be placed under surveillance by
state authorities as a consequence of registering in accordance with
the wagering statute; but their disclosures do not relate to offenses
already committed. Criminal sanctions will not follow in the wake
of disclosures that a man is an alien, a lobbyist, or the representa-
tive of foreign governmental interests.
But not all registration statutes fall within the same category
regarding criminal sanctions. The Internal Security Act of 1950
imposes registration requirements upon leaders and members of
certain organizations, and there can be immediate and severe
consequences for those who disclose membership. 1 5 Under the
terms of this Act, the Subversive Activities Control Board is em-
powered to identify communist-action or communist-front orga-
nizations, 1°6 as defined in the law. 0 7 Within thirty days after the
Board has taken this first step, the officers of the organization are
required to register with the Department of Justice, providing
such information as is called for on the registration forms. 0 8 There
is also a statutory requirement that individual members of the
identified organization register if (1) the leaders failed to do so;
or (2) their names were not included on the list filed by the officials
of the organization 0 9 The Act also prescribes severe penalties
for failure to register."0
An individual is faced with a dilemma in view of these re-
quirements. If he fails to register, there is the likelihood that
criminal sanctions will be imposed for violating the statute's ex-
plicit requirements. If he does register as a member of a com-
103 Lobbyists are required to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk
of the House. 2 U.S.C.A. § 267 (1964).
104 Foreign propagandists and representatives of foreign governments, except as
stipulated in law, are required to register under the provisions of 22 U.S.C.A. § 612 (1964).
105 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1960),
for the consequences of disclosing membership.
106 50 U.S.C.A. § 791(e) (1964).
107 These organizations are identified in the public policy section of the law, 50
U.S.C.A. § 781, and are defined in § 782 (1964).
108 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 786-788 (1964)..
109 50 U.S.C.A. § 787 (1964).
110 Penalties for failure to register are prescribed for organizations in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 794(a), and for individuals in (b) (1964).
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munist action organization, he faces the possibility of criminal
prosecutions under the Smith Act,"' as well as the disability
features of the Internal Security Act. 112 Loss of job or other social
sanctions are not, of course, justifiable reasons for claiming the
privilege; but the self-incrimination clause is surely brought into
play by reason of the strong possibility of criminal action under
national laws.
A long, often confused, pathway led from the adoption of the
Internal Security Act in 1950 to the Court's disposition of one
self-incrimination issue in 1965. One decision, Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. (1961), 1 3 is especially perti-
nent to this essay. In that case, the Court was called upon to answer
several constitutional questions, including one arising from the
registration requirement. The Communist Party was the first of
the communist-action organizations identified by the Board. Its
officials refused to register the organization as required by law,
claiming the privilege of the fifth amendment as a bar to this
statutory requirement. In its argument the Party claimed that its
officers were deprived of an opportunity to assert the privilege,
since persons who go forward to claim it call attention to them-
selves as surely "as if they had in fact filed a registration state-
ment.""' 4 A divided Court decided that the issue had been raised
prematurely. But even while stating that the constitutional issue
was not yet ripe, the Court proceeded to discuss the matter in
some detail.
Admittedly, this was not an easy matter for judicial disposi-
tion. The privilege is no more an absolute right than any other
found in the Constitution, a fact apparent in the Court's classifi-
cations of instances in which non-self-incrimination may not be
asserted. Secondly, the issue of ripeness has been important to
justices who subscribe to the principle of self-restraint, fearful
11 This 1940 statute makes it a crime to advocate the violent overthrow of govern-
ment in the United States; and it also defines as a crime willful membership in any
organization, the purposes of which are advocacy and violent revolutionary means to
reaching their goals. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 et seq. (1964).
112 E.g., inability to hold nonelective governmental office, 50 U.S.C.A. § 784 (1964).
Denial of passports to members in violation of the act was held unconstitutional in
Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
113 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
114 Id. at 107.
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than an over-zealous use of judicial power might do violence to the
democratic principle of majority rule and to the principle of
separation of powers.115
That part of the Court's decision, which turned upon the
matter of prematurity of the constitutional issue, left open the
question whether the statutory requirements were in conflict with
the self-incrimination clause. At least the Court had directed
itself to a discussion of a possibly related ruling in United States
v. Sullivan (1927).116 However, for reasons which should be men-
tioned, the pertinency of the Sullivan case to the Communist Party
case was questionable.
Sullivan, who was suspected of violating the Volstead Prohi-
bition Act,117 had refused to file an income tax return on the
ground that he might incriminate himself. In this instance, he was
faced with the question whether the required information would
provide, directly or indirectly, disclosures about activities in vio-
lation of the prohibition statute. The Court ruled that the fifth
amendment was not available to persons required to file income
tax returns. However, Justice Holmes offered a partial concession
to the defendant in stating:
If the form of return provided called for answers that the defen-
dant was privileged from making, he could have raised the objec-
tion in return, but could not on that account refuse to make any
return at all118
How pertinent is a concession of this nature to other statutory
requirements, such as those of the Internal Security Act of 1950?
The taxpayer has a certain anonymity in that he is but one of
115 Justice Brandeis stated the key elements of the doctrine of judicial self-restraint
in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). He stated: "The Court developed, for its own
governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which
it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon
it for decision." In summary, these rules are (1) there must be an actual controversy;
(2) constitutional questions will be answered only if the need arises; (3) the narrowest
possible constitutional rule will be formulated; (4) if some nonconstitutional issue can
be the basis for deciding the case, the Court will answer it rather than the constitutional
question; (5) the party bringing the action must have standing to sue; (6) the party raising
the constitutional question may not have benefited from the statute in question; and
(7) if possible to dispose of the case by way of a statutory construction, the Court will
do so rather than decide the constitutional question.
116 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
117 Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305.
118 Supra note 116, at 263.
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many millions of Americans who annually file income tax returns.
He does not, therefore, call attention to himself as does the mem-
ber of a communist-action organization required to register with
the Department of Justice. Secondly, the taxpayer is permitted
to assert the privilege with respect to some questions while prepar-
ing the return; but there is no corresponding stage in the process
of registering as a member of a communist-action organization.
For the latter, if the privilege is to be asserted at all, it must be at
the time that he is directed by the Subversive Activities Control
Board to register as a member of a proscribed organization. Other-
wise, the mere act of identifying one's self as a member of a com-
munist-action organization is an invitation to criminal prosecu-
tion."9
Nothing in the Sullivan decision suggests even a remote possi-
bility that registration requirements of the Internal Security Act
are compatible with the self-incrimination clause. This imperfect
relationship of Sullivan to the question at hand caused Justice
Frankfurter, in the Communist Party case, to comment "that the
applicability of the Sullivan principle here may raise novel and
difficult questions" as to the scope of the self-incrimination
clause.120 The Court's ruling that the constitutional issues "should
not be discussed in advance of the necessity of deciding them,'
121
had left unanswered both the questions and the pertinency of
Sullivan.
Answers to both of these matters were forthcoming four years
later when the Court turned its attention to one statutory require-
ment-registration of individual members. This portion of the
statute came into operation following the failure of the leaders of
the Communist Party to register. In accordance with the statute,
the Attorney General had initiated actions against individuals
believed to be members of the Party. The action was commenced
when, on request of the Attorney General, the Board ordered
119 This Will probably depend upon whether he is an "active" member as per the
Court's definition in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), or a "passive" member
as in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Regardless of these definitions, the Smith
Act does define as a crime willful membership in any organization, the purpose of which
is the violent overthrow of government. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1964).
120 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 109 (1961).
121 Ibid.
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William Albertson and Roscoe Q. Proctor to register. An order
to this effect was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit.122 Now, unlike the situation in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. (196 1),123 the privilege
against self-incrimination was seasonably raised at the time that
registration was actually required.
In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. (1965),124
the United States relied upon the Sullivan decision, arguing that
the appellants were at liberty to answer some questions, and to
"claim the privilege on the form as to others"; but they could not
"fail to submit a registration statement altogether.' ' 12' The Court
described as misplaced this reliance upon Sullivan. The Court
said that Justice Holmes' declaration:
was based on the view, first, that a self-incrimination claim against
every question on the tax return, or based on the mere submission
of the return, would be virtually frivolous, and second, that to
honor the claim of privilege not asserted at the time the return
was due would make the taxpayer rather than a tribunal the final
arbiter of the merits of the claim. 126
Neither of these, the Court stated, was applicable to the Albertson
case. The board is a tribunal, and it is in the position to judge the
merits of appellants' claim to the privilege. Moreover, there was
nothing frivolous about the claim, since the registration forms
required information of an incriminating nature. 27
An immunity clause was included in the Internal Security
Act. This provided that an admission of membership would not
constitute, per se, a violation of either the Internal Security Act or
any other criminal statute, nor could the required information
from one of the forms, IS 52a, "be received in evidence" against
a registrant in any criminal action. 2s Not even this provision saved
the registration requirement from the limitations imposed by the
self-incrimination clause. The Court held that it was incomplete
122 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 332 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
123 Supra note 113.
124 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
125 Id. at 78.
126 Supra note 124, at 79.
127 The Court made reference to possible action under 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964) or
under 50 U.S.C. § 783(a) (1964). It also mentioned Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961).
128 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1964).
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and did not meet the test as defined many years earlier in Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock (1892)9 since it did not preclude the use of
information from another form, IS 52, as evidence, nor did it
prevent the use of any of the information from either form "as
an investigatory lead."' 80
The disposition of this matter of registration requirements
and an individual's right to claim the privilege was not even sug-
gestive of how the Court might respond to the other matter of the
statute's calling upon organizational leaders to register. But Al-
bertson was in accord with the other recent fifth amendment cases
which had extended the protection of the privilege.
CONCLUSION
Not too many years ago, just prior to the Malloy, Murphy,
Griffin, and Albertson decisions, it was reasonable to ask whether
the self-incrimination clause had not been too narrowly inter-
preted. Such decisions as Knapp v. Schweitzer (1958),"' and Mills
v. Louisiana (1959),32 when added to certain "communist" cases
of the 1950's, might properly lead one to suspect that there was
scant protection to be gained from the fifth amendment. In a real
sense the Court was merely following guidelines that had been
established as early as the case of Brown v. Walker (1896)."' Yet,
the fear that the privilege might he so "watered down" as to con-
stitute no longer an effective safeguard was present for the liber-
tarians on the Court (Warren, Black, and Douglas), and for others.
Such a fear was in the background when Chief Judge Magruder
proposed that if:
it be thought that the privilege is outmoded in the conditions of
the modern age, then the thing to do is to take it out of the Consti-
tution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments of
judicial opinion."
4
Developments in 1964 and since have indicated that the Court is
no longer following a policy of whittling down the clause. Instead
129 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
130 Supra, note 124 at 80.
131 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
132 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
133 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
134 Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (lst Cir. 1954).
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it has moved in the direction of requiring that the privilege against
self-incrimination provide a much broader protection than had
been found in a number of years, the kind of protection which
had once been advocated by the Court's leading laissez faire ex-
ponent, Justice Stephen Field, and more recently by the Court's
most prominent libertarians, Justices Black and Douglas.
